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Foreign direct investment and R&D-offshoring
Abstract
We analyse a two-country model of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and R&Doffshoring. In the basic
model, two firms, each of which is originally situated in only one of the two countries, first decide
whether to build a plant abroad. Then,they decide whether to relocate R&D activities offshore. Finally,
they engage in product-market competition. In this model, FDI liberalization causes a relocation of
R&D activities if intrafirm communication is sufficiently well developed, external spillovers are
substantial, competition is not too strong and foreign markets are not too small. Surprisingly, such a
relocation of R&D activities usually nevertheless increases domestic welfare.
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We analyse a two-country model of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and R&D-
offshoring. In the basic model, two firms, each of which is originally situated in
only one of the two countries, first decide whether to build a plant abroad. Then,
they decide whether to relocate R&D activities offshore. Finally, they engage in
product market competition. In this model, FDI liberalization causes a relocation
of R&D activities if intrafirm communication is sufficiently well developed, external
spillovers are substantial, competition is not too strong and foreign markets are not
too small. Surprisingly, such a relocation of R&D activities usually nevertheless
increases domestic welfare.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyses the determinants of multinational firms’ choices of loca-
tions for production and R&D. We start from a set of stylized facts:
Stylized Fact 1 Most of the private-sector R&D is done by multinational
firms.
Global business R&D expenditure in 2002 amounts to $450 billion, of
which at least two thirds are carried out by multinationals (UNCTAD, 2005).
Importantly, R&D offshoring is gaining pace:
Stylized Fact 2 Multinationals increasingly move R&D offshore.
The global R&D expenditure of foreign affiliates amounted to $30 billion
in 1993 and $67 billion in 2002 (UNCTAD, 2005). While the share of foreign
affiliates in total business R&D is still not very high, it is increasing rapidly.1
This mirrors a broader pattern concerning international service outsourcing.
While the share of business services produced abroad is still very low, it has
grown substantially recently (Amiti and Wei, 2004).
A large empirical literature investigates what kind of locations are likely
to be hosts of R&D offshoring. The findings are summarized as follows.2
Stylized Fact 3 R&D by foreign affiliates is attracted particularly to
(i) large markets and markets with high per capita income;
(ii) locations where the firms have manufacturing and sales activities;
(iii) countries with large technological know-how (technology sourcing).
Part (iii) reflects the fact that firms are increasingly using knowledge
generated in their international subsidiaries as an input to home-country
production. Thus, foreign R&D is often accompanied by technology sourcing.
For instance, this influenced the location decisions of Japanese firms in the
US (Kogut and Chang, 1991). More generally, the importance of technology
sourcing has been documented in many empirical papers.3
1For similar statements, see Caves (1996, ch.7), Florida (1997), Kuemmerle (1999),
Belderbos (2001), von Zedtwitz and Gassmann (2002), Belderbos (2003).
2See, for example, Zejan (1990), Belderbos (2001, 2003).
3Relevant studies include: Cantwell and Hodson (1991), Håkanson and Nobel (1993),
In spite of their growing importance, R&D offshoring and technology
sourcing have hardly been analysed theoretically. Important questions are:
(i) What circumstances favor offshoring and technology sourcing?
(ii) What are typical characteristics of R&D host countries?
(iii) How are multinational firms’ choices of production locations influenced
by considerations concerning R&D locations?
(iv) What are the welfare effects of R&D offshoring?
We analyse these issues in a simple model which is designed to capture
the above stylized facts, in particular, 2 and 3. There are two countries and
two firms, each of which is originally situated in only one of the two countries.
In Stage 1, firms decide whether to build one plant in the foreign country.4
In Stage 2, they decide whether to relocate cost-reducing R&D activities off-
shore and, in stage 3, they engage in product-market competition. Following
Marshall (1920), there are external locational knowledge spillovers: If firms
carry out R&D in the same location, knowledge flows from one firm to the
other, for instance, because employees change firms, or because informal con-
tacts are more likely. As a result, the cost reduction is greater than if each
firm innovates in an isolated location.5
In principle, cost reductions generated in the parent firm also accrue to the
subsidiary, and vice versa. However, we assume that there are (usually small)
imperfections in the internal knowledge flows in both directions. Thus, a cost
reduction in the parent firm will possibly lead to a smaller cost reduction in
the subsidiary and vice versa.
Therefore, FDI has a dual role: apart from market access, it allows for
technology sourcing which requires that firms move to R&D centers where
they have to build up absorptive capacity of their own to benefit from
spillovers. The knowledge obtained in these R&D centers is transferred to
the home countries, where it reduces costs and thus increases profits. For
Neven and Siotis (1993), OECD (1994), Baily and Gersbach (1995), Almeida (1996),
Florida (1997), Kuemmerle (1997), Branstetter (2000), Frost (2001) and Griffith et al.
(2004).
4We are abstracting from the possibility of multiple subsidiaries.
5As usual in the literature, we model the extent of external spillovers as an exogenous
parameter. In Gersbach and Schmutzler (2003a,b), however, we show how spillovers can
be endogenized in a wage-bidding game.
instance, in the financial service industry, London has emerged as the dom-
inant research center in Europe. Similarly, in the computer industry, many
foreign firms moved parts of their R&D activities to Silicon Valley to benefit
from the presence of their North-American competitors.
We obtain the following answers to the four questions posed above: first,
FDI liberalization may induce R&D offshoring when intrafirm communica-
tion is sufficiently strong, product-market competition is sufficiently weak
and external spillovers are sufficiently strong. Surprisingly, however, there
are potential non-monotone effects of improving intrafirm communication
and higher external spillovers on the extent of FDI. Second, compared to a
setting without the possibility of R&D relocation, FDI becomes more attrac-
tive. Third, offshoring usually increases domestic welfare since it only occurs
if intrafirm communication is well developed and therefore knowledge gener-
ated and obtained abroad flows back to the domestic country. Fourth, though
there are also conceivable countereffects, large markets are particularly at-
tractive as R&D hosts because the knowledge generated in the subsidiaries
can then also be used to improve competitiveness in those markets.
The R&D decisions of multinationals have been examined by other au-
thors; to our knowledge, however, none of them treats FDI and R&D lo-
cations as jointly endogenous, except for our earlier paper (Gersbach and
Schmutzler, 1999). The spillover technology we use in the present paper,
with both intrafirm and interfirm spillovers, goes back to this earlier con-
tribution. However, the original paper addressed very different questions.6
Building from the model of spillovers introduced in Gersbach and Schmutzler
(1999), Belderbos et al. (2008) provide a theory of R&D locations, but treat
FDI as exogenous.7 Papers such as Lin and Saggi (1998), Siotis (1999), Petit
and Sanna-Randaccio (2000), Norbäck (2001), Glass and Saggi (2002), Bjor-
vatn and Eckel (2006), Sanna-Randaccio and Veugelers (2007) and Dawid et
6In a setting with Bertrand competition, we asked under which circumstances multi-
plant firms produce in some joint location so as to benefit from technology sourcing.
7These authors concentrate exclusively on choices of R&D locations, assuming that
both firms operate in both markets. Also, welfare issues are not treated. Whereas we take
one polar case (namely that a firm’s R&D can only occur in one location), Belderbos et
al. (2008) emphasize the other polar case that R&D is perfectly divisible across locations.
Moreover, they allow for asymmetries between firms.
al. (2008) discuss FDI decisions in their relation to innovation and spillovers,
without considering offshoring.
Section 2 introduces the model. In Section 3, we analyse the equilibria
of the R&D location game. Section 4 calculates the subgame perfect (FDI)
equilibria. Section 5 provides more specific results for a Cournot example.
Section 6 discusses welfare effects. Section 7 extends the game to asym-
metric countries. Section 8 contains a more general robustness discussion
with various extensions of our model. Section 9 concludes and sketches some
generalizations of the model.
2 The model
2.1 Stages of the game
Consider the following three-stage game. There are two firms, k = 1 , 2 , and
two countries, s = 1 , 2 . Initially firm 1 has a plant in country 1 , and firm 2
has a plant in country 2 . The firms’ actions can be summarized as follows:
Stage 1: Firms decide whether to carry out FDI or not (FDI stage).
Stage 2: Firms choose R&D locations (offshoring stage).
Stage 3: Product market competition takes place.
In Stage 1, each firm decides whether to become multinational, that is,
whether to build an additional plant in the country where it has no produc-
tion facilities, at a fixed cost of F > 0 In Stage 2, firms decide whether to
continue to carry out their R&D activities (or ’innovate’) at home (H ) or
whether to relocate them abroad (A). Relocation involves fixed costs R > 0 .
In the basic version of our model, we make two simplifying assumptions.
First, we assume that relocation (or ’offshoring’) is only possible if the firm
has carried out FDI.8 Second, in case of relocation, the R&D location at home
is closed.9 Each firm therefore has exactly one location where it performs
8This is consistent with item (ii) in Stylized Fact 3 that firms tend to locate R&D near
production.
9Of course, this decision could be endogenized. Intuitively, firms will not have two R&D
locations if either the fixed costs of maintaining both locations are high or if intrafirm
communication is sufficiently well developed. We assume that duplication of R&D is not
R&D, and relocation is treated as a zero-one decision. The assumptions will
be relaxed in Sections 8.1 and 8.4, respectively.10
Two important considerations are assumed to influence the cost structure:
(i) External spillovers: When both firms carry out R&D in the same countr,
they benefit from external knowledge spillovers which allow them to
produce at lower marginal costs than if they carry out R&D alone.
The assumption that external spillovers only arise in locations where both
firms have R&D activities is plausible if absorbing knowledge that is relevant
for R&D requires the local presence of qualified personnel.
(ii) Intrafirm knowledge transfer: knowledge generated in the parent firm
is useful in subsidiaries (and vice versa), but the resulting cost reduction
from R&D is usually not as large as in the location where the knowledge
is generated.
As intrafirm knowledge transfer helps to avoid duplication in research
efforts, it has long been recognized as a reason for the emergence of multi-
national firms (Dunning, 1981; Caves, 1996).11 There are many reasons why
intrafirm communication might not be perfect, however. Obviously, there
could be costs of communication between different plants and costs of in-
trafirm labour mobility. There might also be incentive problems: if managers
of different plants are rewarded according to relative performance schemes,
they may not be willing to release all relevant information.
The existence of external spillovers and (imperfect) intrafirm knowledge
transfer translates naturally into the following assumptions about marginal
costs, which are assumed to be constant. As a reference cost level h, it is
convenient to use production costs in the absence of R&D. The maximal
cost reduction ∆ relative to h is obtained in locations where both firms are
present with their R&D activities, so that (i) there are external spillovers and
(ii) knowledge can be used locally, that is, without transferring it between
profitable, which puts a lower bound on the cost of duplication of R&D and the strength
of intrafirm knowledge transfer.
10This is consistent with item (ii) in Stylized Fact 3 that firms tend to locate R&D near
production.
11See Baily and Gersbach (1995) for some evidence.
parents and subsidiary or vice versa. The cost structures in all possible cases
are thus given as follows:
(i) Suppose there is a location i where both firms are present with their R&D
activities (and with FDI as a precondition for R&D). Then
(a) marginal costs in i are h −∆ for both firms, because the firms both
benefit from knowledge spillovers and there are no losses from internal
transfer of knowledge.
(b) marginal costs in location j 6= i are h − γ∆ for some γ ∈ (0 , 1 ): A
fraction (1 − γ) of the cost reduction in location i is lost due to internal
knowledge transfer to j .
(ii) Suppose there is no location i where both firms are present with their
R&D activities, and thus no external spillovers occur. Then
(a) marginal costs in a firm’s R&D location are given as h − β∆ for some
β ∈ (0 , 1 ). The firm does not benefit from external spillovers; it has to
rely exclusively on knowledge it has generated locally.
(b) marginal costs in a location without own R&D are h − βγ∆ > 0 : The
firm does not benefit from external knowledge spillovers and has to rely
on knowledge it has generated elsewhere.
Costs are thus lowest in case (i)(a) and highest in (ii)(b).12 The ranking
between the costs in cases (i)(b) and (ii)(a) (that is, the relative size of
β and γ) depends on whether internal knowledge transfer is more effective
than external spillovers. For low values of β, external spillovers are essential
for cost reduction, because the difference between costs without and with
spillovers is h − β∆− (h −∆) = (1 − β)∆.
In Stage 3, both firms take production decisions, with marginal costs
determined as above. Markets are segregated, that is, we consider only non-
tradeable goods or services; but we will extend the discussion to tradeable
goods in Section 8.2.13 Depending on the locations of production and R&D,
12Nevertheless, in case (ii)(b) costs are still lower than in the hypothetical case without
R&D.
13The service sector and the non-tradeable manufacturing sector comprise about two
thirds of the economy in industrialized countries, and both FDI and R&D are becoming
increasingly important in these industries (Neven and Siotis, 1993; Hackmann, 1997).
For example, for banking and finance, business consulting, general merchandising and
possible product market profits in one location are denoted by
ΠM (β),ΠM (γ),ΠD(1 , 1 ),ΠD(γ, γ),ΠD(β, βγ),ΠD(βγ, β),
using the following conventions: ΠM stands for a monopoly profit; ΠD for a
duopoly profit. The entries in brackets stand for cost reductions relative to h:
β corresponds to h − β∆, γ corresponds to h − γ∆, etc. When there are two
entries, the first one corresponds to the firm whose profits we are considering,
the second one to the competitor. For example, ΠD(1 , 1 ) corresponds to the
profits of firms in a research center, ΠD(β, βγ) to the duopoly profit of a
firm in its home country when there is no offshoring. Finally, we simplify
ΠD(1 , 1 ) ≡ ΠD(1 ), ΠD(γ, γ) ≡ ΠD(γ).
Assuming that the unique equilibrium is played in the product market
stage, the game can be reduced to the first two stages, that is, to the choice
of production and innovation locations. The following assumption gives very
weak conditions on the nature of oligopolistic interaction.
Assumption 1 (a) Duopoly profits are decreasing in own costs and increas-
ing in competitor costs.
(b) ΠD(γ) is increasing in γ, and ΠD(γ) < ΠD(1 ).
Part (a) is satisfied in standard oligopoly models; part (b) is satisfied
whenever the positive effect of lower own costs on profits dominates over
the negative effect of lower competitor costs. This requires very reasonable
assumptions on demand elasticities (Shapiro, 1989).
3 The offshoring subgames
There are offshoring subgames with one and two direct investors.
3.1 Subgames with one investor (asymmetric FDI)
Only the direct investor takes an offshoring decision. With offshoring, this
firm obtains payoffs ΠM (γ) +ΠD(1 )− F −R; without, its payoffs are
ΠM (β) +ΠD(βγ, β)− F . Therefore, we obtain:
telecommunications, FDI is the main form of globalization.
Table 1 Subgame with symmetric FDI
H A
H ΠD (β, βγ) +ΠD (βγ, β)− F ΠD (1) +ΠD (γ)− F
ΠD (β, βγ) +ΠD (βγ, β)− F ΠD (1) +ΠD (γ)− F −R
A ΠD (γ) +ΠD (1)− F −R ΠD (β, βγ) +ΠD (βγ, β)− F −R
ΠD (γ) +ΠD (1)− F ΠD (β, βγ) +ΠD (βγ, β)− F −R
Remark 1 Suppose there is only one direct investor. Then there is an
equilibrium where this firm chooses offshoring if and only if
ΠM (γ) +ΠD(1 ) ≥ ΠM (β) +ΠD(βγ, β) + R. (1)
Clearly, low relocation costs (R) favor offshoring. Surprisingly, however,
at this level of generality, the effects of the remaining parameters are still
ambiguous. For instance, both sides of (1) are increasing in γ, so that it is
not obvious whether improved communication leads to more offshoring. In-
tuitively, as communication improves, knowledge generated offshore leads to
high monopoly profits at home, but also to high duopoly profits abroad. How-
ever, the first effect would appear to dominate; at least the Cournot example
in Section 5 confirms that offshoring becomes more likely as communication
improves. Similarly, with better external spillovers (lower β), not engaging
in offshoring means foregoing greater cost reductions, as ΠM (β) is increasing
in β and ΠD(βγ, β) in the first argument. However, lower β also means that
the competitor’s costs without offshoring are higher; so that ΠD(βγ, β) is
not necessary increasing in β. Again, in our Cournot example, the offshoring
equilibrium is more likely for lower β.
3.2 Subgames with two investors (symmetric FDI)
Clearly, there is a ’chicken’ structure in the relocation game, with each
firm preferring the other one to move: While product market profits are the
same for both firms, the firm that carries out R&D offshore has to bear
the relocation costs (see Table 1). The subgame equilibria can therefore be
characterized as follows.
Remark 2 Suppose both firms have carried out FDI. If
ΠD(γ) +ΠD(1 ) ≥ ΠD(β, βγ) +ΠD(βγ, β) + R, (2)
there are two pure-strategy equilibria, (A,H ) and (H ,A). Thus, the equilib-
ria involve offshoring. If the sign in (2) is reversed, then there is an offshoring
equilibrium (H ,H ).
Several remarks are in order. First, for low relocation costs, the equi-
librium (H ,H ) coexists with another, rather implausible, equilibrium where
both firms relocate abroad (A,A). Second, with symmetric FDI, offshoring
equilibria require that competition is not too intense; otherwise firms differ-
entiate each other in terms of R&D locations to soften competition.14 Third,
by (2), offshoring requires external spillovers to be large relative to reloca-
tion costs, so that one firm is willing to bear the cost of offshoring to benefit
from spillovers.15 Fourth, the effects of improving communication are again
ambiguous: By Assumption 1, as γ increases, so does ΠD(γ). Intuitively,
improving communication increases home profits for a firm that offshores.
However, ΠD(βγ, β) +ΠD(β, βγ), the total profits of a firm that does not
offshore, could increase too. Even though a firm that does not offshore faces
tougher competition at home from the competitor that uses knowledge gen-
erated abroad (ΠD(β, βγ) decreases as γ increases), it can also compete more
effectively abroad, using knowledge generated at home (ΠD(βγ, β) increases).
Again, our numerical example will suggest that nevertheless improvements
in communication tend to induce offshoring.
4 Subgame-perfect equilibria
To understand under which conditions offshoring takes place along with FDI,
we now analyse the subgame-perfect equilibria. The preceding analysis sug-
14As competition becomes very intense, the left-hand side of (2) approaches zero, so
that the condition cannot hold.
15Clearly, if β = 0, that is, R&D complementarities are essential for cost reduction, (2)
will always hold for R = 0; for β 6= 0, this is not true in general.
gests that we should distinguish between different parameter regions, accord-
ing to the outcome of the R&D game.
(i) LRC (’low relocation costs’): if (1) and (2) both hold, offshoring obtains
no matter whether one or two firms have carried out FDI.
(ii) HRC (’high relocation costs’): if (1) and (2) are both violated, there
is no offshoring in either type of subgame.
(iii) MRC (’medium relocation costs’): if (1) holds, but (2) does not,
offshoring only takes place if one firm has carried out FDI.16
In regime LRC, relocation costs are so low that there is offshoring in any
subgame with FDI. This immediately rules out all equilibria except for the
following three.
Proposition 1 In regime LRC:
(i) The No-FDI Equilibrium exists if and only if:
ΠM (β) ≥ ΠM (γ) +ΠD(1 )− F −R (3)
(ii) The Symmetric FDI Equilibrium (with offshoring) exists if and only if:
ΠD(γ)− F − R ≥ 0 . (4)
(iii) The Asymmetric FDI Equilibrium (with offshoring) exists if
and only if conditions (1) and (2) do not hold.
Condition (3) guarantees that the no-FDI equilibrium profit is higher
than the profit in the deviation subgame, which involves offshoring in LRC.
For the Symmetric FDI Equilibrium, (4) makes sure both firms want to
invest, bearing in mind that, in LRC, the competitor would relocate in the
equilibrium of the deviation game.
In the MRC regime with intermediate relocation costs, the equilibria are
different, as a symmetric equilibrium with both firms investing cannot involve
16In the numerical example below, it will turn out that (1) typically holds whenever (2)
does. We shall thus refer to the case as MRC (’medium relocation costs’) and ignore the
case that (2) holds, but (1) does not. This case is similar to analyse as the MRC case.
offshoring. As in LRC, however, equilibria with symmetric FDI, with asym-
metric FDI and without FDI all arise. The Appendix gives the conditions
under which each equilibrium arises.
In the HRC regime, R&D offshoring does not take place in any subgame.
Thus, the only issue for firms is whether FDI is worthwhile, that is, whether
ΠD(βγ, β) ≥ F . If so, the equilibrium involves symmetric FDI; if not, there
is no FDI.17 In the Appendix, the result is stated more carefully.
5 The Cournot example
We consider a Cournot example, with linear demand function D(p) = a − p.
We can use standard formulas to calculate equilibrium profits. Throughout
this section, we choose α ≡ a − h = 1 , ∆ = 1 .
5.1 The offshoring game
For these choices of α and ∆, the regime in the offshoring game depends on
the parameters β, γ and R. For sufficiently high relocation costs, there is no
offshoring in equilibrium for arbitrary choices of β and γ, so that regime HRC
arises.18 This can be regarded as the benchmark case without the possibility
of R&D relocation. To allow for relocation, we consider R = 0 .5 . Figure 1
gives the values of β and γ for which each regime arises.19
– Figure 1: The offshoring game –
5.2 FDI equilibria
We now describe the subgame-perfect equilibria. We shall compare the
benchmark case without relocation (R very large) with the case thatR = 0 .5 .
In both cases, we shall consider F = 1 , F = 0 .5 , F = 0 .2 , and F = 0 .1 .
17In the degenerate case where the equilibrium condition holds with equality there is
also an asymmetric equilibrium where only one firm carries out FDI.
18For our parameterization, R = 2 is sufficiently high for this to happen.
19For lower relocation costs, both regime boundaries would shift further to the right.
However, even as relocation costs approach zero, relocation does not necessarily arise for
all parameters.
5.2.1 No offshoring
Suppose relocation is too costly for arbitrary values of β and γ. For F = 1
and F = 0 .5 , No FDI is the only equilibrium, independent of β and γ. For
F = 0 .1 , Symmetric FDI is the only equilibrium. In the intermediate case
F = 0 .2 , the equilibrium depends on parameters (see Fig. 2), with (sym-
metric) FDI arising only for good intrafirm communication (γ high) and low
external spillovers (β high). Intuitively, when there is offshoring, a firm car-
ries out FDI only to gain market access, resulting in profits ΠD(βγ, β). It
relies exclusively on its own R&D, and it must transfer its knowledge abroad
to benefit from FDI. When external spillovers are essential and/or intrafirm
communication is bad, FDI is not worthwhile.
– Figure 2: FDI without offshoring possibilities (F=0.2) –
5.2.2 Offshoring
Suppose relocation is possible (R = 0 .5 ). As before, for F = 1 , No FDI
is the only equilibrium. For F = 0 .5 , however, Fig. 3 shows that there is
asymmetric FDI when intrafirm communication is very good and external
spillovers are essential.20 One firm engages in FDI and offshoring, so as to
benefit from external spillovers. It uses the knowledge obtained to increase
its monopoly profit abroad. FDI thus requires the offshoring possibility: As
we saw above, without offshoring possibilities, No FDI is the only equilibrium
for F = 0 .5 .
– Figure 3: The FDI game with low relocation costs (F=0.5) –
For F = 0 .2 , Fig. 4 shows that, in the HRC region, for sufficiently good
intrafirm communication and internal R&D, there is symmetric FDI, as in
the case without offshoring option. Firms do not gain from offshoring, but
they can earn sufficient profits in the foreign location even so. In the LRC
region and in the MRC region for sufficiently good intrafirm communication
and spillovers, there is asymmetric FDI with offshoring in a large region
where there was No FDI without the offshoring option.
20Here and in the following figures, dashed lines describe regime boundaries in the
offshoring game.
– Figure 4: The FDI game with low relocation costs (F=0.2) –
For F = 0 .1 , Fig. 5 shows that, in regime HRC, for sufficiently good
internal R&D (β high) and intrafirm communication (γ high), there is no
FDI. Without the prospect of external spillovers there is not enough to be
gained from FDI, because internal technology transfer is not very good. In
intermediate ranges, there is symmetric FDI. In most of this region, this is
true even though there is no offshoring and thus no benefit from external
spillovers. Internal communication is sufficiently well developed that the
foreign location can benefit from cost reductions at home. Finally in most
of the LRC and MRC regime, there is an asymmetric FDI equilibrium. The
prospects of external spillovers lure one firm into the other country.
– Figure 5: The FDI game with low relocation costs (F=0.1) –
5.3 Summary
The analysis reveals that the offshoring option makes FDI more likely: for
F = 0 .5 , FDI does not arise without the offshoring possibility, whereas it
does for sufficiently low relocation costs.21 For F = 0 .2 or F = 0 .1 , the
parameter regions with FDI become larger when offshoring is possible, as
a comparison of Fig. 2 with Figs 4 and 5 shows. Moreover, asymmetric
FDI, with only one firm carrying out FDI and offshoring R&D can arise in a
symmetric setting. Moreover, both internal and external spillovers can have
non-monotone effects on FDI: For instance, for suitable parameter values
higher external spillovers (decreases in β) lead from symmetric FDI to No
FDI and then to asymmetric FDI (Fig. 4).
6 The welfare effects of FDI
The welfare effects of FDI on source countries and recipients have been the
subject of considerable debate, and they are often regarded as ambiguous.22
21We have shown that relocation arises when there are no relocation costs, but by
continuity, it also arises for small positive values of R.
22See Graham and Krugman (1989), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Neven and Siotis
(1993), Caves (1996), Sanna-Randaccio (1996) and Markusen and Venables (1997) for an
Based on our analysis, we can obviously not give a complete discussion of
this point. Most importantly, welfare discussions of offshoring typically put
particular emphasis on the displacement of skilled labour (e.g., job losses of
computer programmers in the US as a consequence of software development
to India). Our model does not address this topic directly, because labour is
only treated implicitly as a cost factor. Several issues could be considered if a
broader perspective is adapted. First, when labour markets are flexible, gen-
eral equilibrium considerations suggest that reducing home country demand
by offshoring will reduce wages and thus R&D employees will be reemployed
in other sectors. The extent of wage cuts and reemployability depends on
how general the skills of displaced R&D workers are. Second, deterioration
of home country employment is likely to reduce the willingness to acquire the
necessary skills. This could happen if offshoring waves are expected and gen-
eral equilibrium effects are slow to generate new employment opportunities.
In such cases R&D offshoring might even generate outward migration.
In the following, we show that, even ignoring these employment effects,
there is an interesting channel by which offshoring affects welfare which is
based on knowledge transfer and spillovers.
Proposition 2 Suppose γ > β. Further, suppose the equilibrium involves
asymmetric FDI and offshoring by firm 2. Then, welfare in country 2, defined
as the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus, net of fixed costs and
relocation costs, is higher than it would be if no firm had invested in FDI.
In country 1 the consumer surplus is higher than without FDI, whereas the
effect on producer surplus is ambiguous.
Proof For an offshoring equilibrium, profits for firm 2 must be higher than
in the case without FDI. Thus, a sufficient condition for welfare to increase is
that consumer surplus does. As country 2 is served by a monopoly no matter
whether offshoring takes place or not, the consumer surplus increases if and
only if the costs are lower with offshoring than without. This is true if the
cost reduction from external spillovers dominates over the cost increase from
having to rely on internal communication, that is, if γ > β. ¤
The assumption γ > β makes sure that the home-country cost reduction
assessment of the arguments.
from technology sourcing outweighs the losses from intra-firm communica-
tion. This guarantees that home-country consumers benefits from lower
prices. Of course, even if β ≥ γ, welfare may be higher in an asymmet-
ric offshoring equilibrium than in an equilibrium without FDI, provided the
producer surplus is much higher in the former case.
7 The impact of market size
The empirical literature suggests that offshoring locations are more likely to
emerge in larger markets. We now give theoretical support for this statement,
albeit with a qualification. We show that, for certain parameter constella-
tions, the larger country is more likely to emerge as the offshoring location,
but there are also conceivable situations where the smaller market is the off-
shoring host. To understand this, we introduce subscripts S and L for profits
in the small and large country, respectively. The following assumption cap-
tures the essence of market size:
Assumption 2 (i) For arbitrary cost constellations, profits are larger in the
large country, that is ΠML (.) ≥ Π
M
S (.), Π
D
L (.) ≥ Π
D
S (.).
(ii) For arbitrary cost constellations, profit increases resulting from lower
costs are larger in the large country.
We now ask whether an asymmetric FDI equilibrium is more likely to
occur in the large country than in the small country. We confine ourselves to
the LRC-regime; with R = 0 . Arguing as in Proposition 1, an Asymmetric
FDI Equilibrium in the large country requires
ΠDS (γ) ≤ F , (5)
F ≤ ΠDL (1 ) +Π
M
S (γ)−Π
M
S (β). (6)
Condition (5) makes sure that the firm that is located only in the large
country does not deviate by adding a plant abroad; inequality (6) guarantees
that the firm that carries out FDI and practices R&D-offshoring gains from
doing so rather than refraining from FDI. An asymmetric FDI equilibrium
in the small country requires
ΠDL (γ) ≤ F , (7)
F ≤ ΠDS (1 ) +Π
M
L (γ)−Π
M
L (β). (8)
Clearly, (5) for the large country is easier to satisfy than the corresponding
condition (7) for the small country: for the non-investor, deviating from an
asymmetric FDI equilibrium in a large country by investing in the small
country is less attractive than deviating from an asymmetric FDI equilibrium
in a small country by investing in the large country. Hence, the conditions
for the asymmetric equilibrium are easier to satisfy when the large country
is the research location provided (8) implies (6), that is,
ΠDL (1 )−Π
D
S (1 ) ≥ Π
M
L (γ)−Π
M
L (β)− (Π
M
S (γ)−Π
M
S (β)). (9)
The left-hand side is always positive, as the firm that carries out FDI
and offshore R&D has higher duopoly profits in a large location. If β > γ,
the right-hand side is negative. Since it is cheaper to serve the monopoly
location with own home country R&D than by sourcing from abroad, there
is a second reason why an R&D location in a large country is more robust
than in a small country: The losses from not serving the monopoly with local
R&D are smaller when the monopoly location is small. Thus (9) holds and
offshoring into the large country is more likely.
If γ > β, however, the right-hand side of (9) is also positive by part (ii) of
Assumption 2: When the R&D location is large, the offshoring firm benefits
less from the positive R&D effects in its (small) home country monopoly.
Therefore, the equilibrium conditions are not necessarily easier to satisfy in
the large country. Indeed, consider a scenario where product market com-
petition in each market is very strong (e.g., close to homogeneous Bertrand
competition) and thus (9) is violated.23 Then, product market profits in both
countries are essentially zero, and thus so is the left-hand side of (9). The
right-hand side, however, can be very negative. Intuitively, in this setting,
23By ’strong competition’, we mean any type of product competition such that ΠDL (1) is
suffciently low. For instance, think of price competition with goods that are not strongly
differentiated.
market access is no reason for FDI and offshoring, whereas technology sourc-
ing is. Therefore, compared to an R&D center in a large country, a center in
the small country has the advantage that the gains in the monopoly location
are larger, and essentially no disadvantage.
8 Extensions
We now extend the basic model in several directions. First, we allow for
offshoring in locations where the firm is not present with production. Second,
we consider finite transportation costs. Third, we shall vary the timing of
the game. Finally, we allow for partial rather than complete R&D offshoring.
8.1 Offshoring without FDI
If we modify the basic model by assuming that offshoring is possible for both
firms at cost R > 0 for arbitrary investment decisions, the offshoring and the
FDI decision are decoupled: Because access to knowledge does not require
the presence of a production location, firms carry out FDI if and only if the
resulting duopoly profits in the foreign country justify the fixed costs.
In Appendix 2, we show in more detail how the analysis has to be mod-
ified. For every combination of FDI decisions both players have to decide
whether or not to offshore. We show that essentially as before, offshoring
takes place in all relevant subgames when intrafirm knowledge flows are good,
relocation costs are low and external spillovers are high.
Assuming that these conditions for offshoring are met, we then provide
conditions for an equilibrium without FDI, but with offshoring. Consistent
with the intuition given above, such an equilibrium exists if and only if
ΠD(1 ) ≤ F . When offshoring without FDI is possible, the only motive for
FDI is market access to the foreign country. In the basic model, there was
an additional incentive for FDI, namely to obtain the option of offshoring
and thereby gain access to external spillovers which increase home country
profits. Net of relocation costs, this option is worth ΠM (γ)−ΠM (β)−R.24
24See Condition (3) in Proposition 1 of the paper.
Whenever this expression is positive, the No FDI equilibrium arises for a
larger parameter region than in the basic model.
While FDI typically becomes less attractive for firms than in the basic
model, the welfare effects for the home country are still positive whenever
offshoring arises: Firms only move R&D offshore when it is profitable for
them, and consumers benefit from the cost reduction.
Decoupling of offshoring and FDI decisions allows us to consider another
variant of our model, namely that R&D offshoring precedes FDI. This analy-
sis is very similar to the analysis in this section, as the only motive for FDI
is market access to the foreign country while R&D offshoring enables access
to external spillovers. All qualitive conclusions regarding the emergence of
offshoring and FDI remain as before.
8.2 Tradable Goods
For convenience, we ignored the possibility of finite transportation costs so
far, thus focussing on the case that exports are never an alternative. In
the following, we modify the basic model (where offshoring requires foreign
production) by considering low transportation costs such that firms have no
reason to carry out FDI unless they benefit from spillovers. We denote the
transportation costs per unit of the commodity by t and for definiteness, we
set t = 0 .25 Thus, the quality of intrafirm communication is irrelevant for
FDI and offshoring decisions, as goods can be exported from wherever they
are produced most cheaply to the other country at zero cost.
When only one firm has chosen FDI, it will relocate R&D offshore if and
only if
2ΠD(1 )− 2ΠD(β)−R ≥ 0 : (10)
Both firms obtain identical profits ΠD(1 ) in both locations. After devia-
tion to No FDI, both firms will produce in their home location, resulting in
profits ΠD(β) for each firm in each location.
We now assume that (10) holds, so that relocation will take place in the
25In Appendix 3, we shall show that similar results hold for intermediate transportation
costs such that exports will always take place in the absence of FDI, that is, when the
market cannot be served locally, but not when the firm is present locally.
offshoring game. The condition for an equilibrium without FDI then becomes
F ≥ 2ΠD(1 )− 2ΠD(β)−R: (11)
There is no FDI if the net gains from offshoring are dominated by the
fixed costs. One might think that, with finite transportation costs, FDI is
less attractive than with infinite transportation costs, because exports are
always an option which would yield foreign profits of ΠD(β) ≥ 0 . However,
the condition under which (11) is more easily fulfilled than (1) is
ΠD(β) ≥ ΠM (β)−ΠM (γ) +ΠD(1 )−ΠD(β):
The FDI incentives in the case of infinite transportation costs differ from
those with zero transportation costs not only because they include the for-
eign country profitsΠD(β). In addition, for infinite transportation costs, FDI
changes home country profits by ΠM (γ)−ΠM (β), for zero transportation
costs the effect is ΠD(1 )−ΠD(β). However, at least when internal knowl-
edge flows are sufficiently good (so that γ is close to 1 ), the effects should
typically be mutually reinforcing. A cost reduction by a certain amount for
a monopolist is worth more than a simultaneous cost reduction of both firms
in an oligopoly. Hence, with well-developed internal communication, the in-
tuition that FDI is less attractive with low transportation costs than with
infinite transportation costs holds in our model.
Finally, we note that the home country welfare effects of offshoring remain
positive whenever it takes place, because offshoring will only happen when
the firms benefit, and consumers also benefit from the cost reduction.
8.3 Simultaneous decisions
The main insights still hold if the decisions concerning FDI and R&D are
carried out simultaneously. Then, each firm has three possible strategies:
No FDI, FDI without offshoring and FDI with offshoring. The payoffs for
each of the nine resulting strategy profiles can be derived as before. An
equilibrium without FDI requires that firms neither deviate to FDI with or
without offshoring; hence, conditions (1) and (14) in the Appendix have to
hold simultaneously. As before, the equilibrium is likely to arise with high
fixed costs and relocation costs and with intense product market competition,
whereas, with bad intrafirm communication and low R&D-spillovers, similar
qualifications arise as in the sequential case. Contrary to the sequential case,
however, an asymmetric equilibrium with only one firm carrying out FDI and
offshoring cannot exist, except for degenerate cases.
An equilibrium with both firms carrying out FDI and one firm offshoring
exists, provided condition (2) holds and, in addition,
ΠD(γ) +ΠD(1 ) ≥ ΠD(β, βγ) + F + R
and
ΠD(γ) ≥ F .
As in the sequential model, the offshoring equilibrium essentially requires
parameters to be opposite than for the No-FDI equilibrium.26
8.4 Partial offshoring decisions
So far, offshoring was a zero-one decision: A firm can either move its either
R&D abroad, or leave everything at home. This is obviously a polar case.
We now move to the other polar case that a firm can choose how to allocate
its fixed budgets between the two locations in an arbitrary way.
Thus we allow firms to move some arbitrary fraction λi offshore at a
cost K (λi). For instance, extending our assumptions on cost reductions for
λi∈ {0 , 1} linearly to the entire interval [0 , 1 ], firm i obtains a cost reduction
(1 − λi)(λj+(1 − λj )β) + γ(λi(1 − λj ) + λjβ)
at home and
γ(1 − λi)(λj+(1 − λj )β) + (λi(1 − λj ) + λjβ)
abroad. As an example for how offshoring decisions are made in the contin-
26The only qualification concerns intra-firm spillovers which again have ambiguous ef-
fects on the offshoring equilibrium.
uous setting, consider the subgame where only firm 1 has carried out FDI.
Thus, it has a monopoly at home and faces a competitor abroad that must
have λ2= 0 , because it cannot offshore its R&D to foreign locations. Ignoring
fixed costs of FDI and relocation, payoffs of firm 1 are
ΠM ((1 − λ1 )β + γλ1 ) +Π
D(γ(1 − λ1 )β + λ1 , (1 − λ1 )β + λ1 )−K (λi).
Denote the arguments of ΠM as x and of ΠD as x1 and x2 . Then, the
net marginal benefits of offshoring (increasing λ1 ) are
(γ − β)dΠ
M
dx
+(1 − βγ)∂Π
D
1
∂x 1
+(1 − γ)∂Π
D
2
∂x 2
−K 0(λ1 ).
This term consists of (i) a cost-effect on the monopoly profit (which is pos-
itive if external spillovers are strong and intrafirm communication is good);
(ii) a positive effect on own duopoly profits resulting from the fact that own
costs in the foreign location are lower with more offshoring, (iii) a negative
effect on duopoly profits resulting from the fact that the competitor also
benefits from external spillovers, and (iv) marginal relocation costs. The
optimal level of relocation is obtained by setting the net marginal benefit of
relocation equal to zero. The analysis for the case where both firms carry out
FDI is similar. In this fashion, one can obtain general comparative-statics
condition for R&D. For the Cournot model and particular specifications of
the relocation costs, different FDI/RDI constellations can be obtained.
9 Conclusions
We presented a model of multinational activity that differs from existing
work in several respects. Most importantly, we provide the only contribution
where FDI and R&D offshoring are both endogenous. The model is set up
so that there are potentially two motives for FDI, namely access to markets
and to knowledge generated locally.
Our first set of conclusions was derived for the case where (i) transporta-
tion costs are infinite and (ii) R&D offshoring can only arise in locations
where firms are present with production. We obtained the following results.
First, FDI liberalization may lead to R&D offshoring. This requires suf-
ficiently strong intrafirm communication, sufficiently weak product-market
competition and sufficiently strong external spillovers. Surprisingly, however,
once one moves beyond a simple linear Cournot model, there are potential
non-monotone effects of intrafirm communication and external spillovers on
the extent of FDI. Second, the possibility of R&D relocation makes FDI
more attractive. Third, in our simple short-term partial equilibrium model
offshoring usually increases domestic welfare since it only occurs if intrafirm
communication is well developed and therefore knowledge generated and ob-
tained abroad flows back to the domestic country27. Fourth, though there
are also conceivable countereffects, large markets are particularly attractive
as R&D hosts because the knowledge generated in the subsidiaries can then
also be used to improve competitiveness in those markets.
These conclusions have to be modified when R&D offshoring does not
presuppose the existence of production facilities. In this case,b there is a
decoupling of FDI and offshoring decisions: FDI takes place if and only if
the market access motive suffices to justify the fixed costs. When we change
the basic model by allowing for the possibility of exports, market access is
no longer a strong motive for FDI (at least when transportation costs are
very low). Instead, the access to knowledge becomes the dominant motive
for FDI. Importantly, however, the welfare-enhancing aspect of offshoring
survives both modifications.
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Appendix 1: Equilibria for MRC and HRC
We now summarize the equilibrium structure in regime MRC.
Remark 3 In regime MRC:
(i) A No-FDI equilibrium exists if and only if
ΠM (β) ≥ ΠM (γ) +ΠD (1 )− F −R. (12)
(ii) A Symmetric FDI equilibrium exists if and only if
ΠD(β, βγ) +ΠD (βγ, β)− F ≥ ΠD(1 ). (13)
(iii) An Asymmetric FDI equilibrium exists if and only if (12) and (13) hold
with signs reversed.
Intuitively, condition (12) makes sure that the profits in the No-FDI case
are higher than under deviation to FDI, bearing in mind that the firm would
relocate following such a deviation inMRC. (13) guarantees that the investing
firm does not want to deviate by not investing.
The equilibrium structure in regime HRC is summarized as follows.
Remark 4 In regime HRC:
(i) A No-FDI equilibrium exists if and only if
0 ≥ ΠD (βγ, β)− F . (14)
(ii) A Symmetric FDI equilibrium exists if and only if
ΠD(βγ, β)− F ≥ 0 . (15)
Intuitively, as there can be no R&D offshoring on the equilibrium path
or in any deviation subgame, firms earn ΠD ((βγ, β)−F in an FDI location.
Thus, carrying out FDI is worthwhile if and only if ΠD(βγ, β) > F .28
28In the degenerate case that ΠD (βγ, β) = F , there is an asymmetric FDI equilibrium
that is not strict.
Appendix 2: Offshoring without local produc-
tion
We first derive conditions for equilibria with offshoring.29
Proposition 3 When both firms can choose offshoring independent of the
production location decisions, the equilibria of the relocation subgames are
as follows:
(i) In the subgame without FDI, there are equilibria with R&D offshoring of
one of the firms if and only if
ΠM (γ)− R ≥ ΠM (β). (16)
(ii) In subgames with asymmetric FDI, there is R&D offshoring of the
investor if and only if
ΠM (γ) + ΠD (1 )−R ≥ ΠM (β) +ΠD(βγ, β). (17)
Proof (i) In the subgame without FDI, payoffs in the proposed equilibrium
are given as ΠM (γ)−R for the offshoring firm and ΠM (1) for the competitor.
If the offshoring firm deviates, its profits are ΠM (β). The condition in (i)
guarantees that this deviation is not profitable. For the other firm, deviation
to offshoring would lower its payoffs as ΠM (γ)−R < ΠM (1).
(ii) In the subgame with asymmetric FDI, payoffs in the proposed equilibrium
are given as ΠM (γ)+ΠD (1)−F−R for the offshoring investor. Deviating to
no offshoring would yield profits of ΠM (β)+ΠD (βγ, β)−F . Condition (17)
guarantees this is not profitable. Equilibrium payoffs for the competitor are
ΠD (1); deviating to offshoring would yield profits of ΠD (βγ, β)−R. Because
ΠD (βγ, β) ≤ ΠD (β) ≤ ΠD (1), this is never profitable. ¤
The following implication is immediate:
Corollary 1 Offshoring equilibria exist in the No FDI and Asymmetric FDI
subgames if γ = 1 , R = 0 and β is strictly below 1 .
29Also, we ignore the implausible equilibrium where the non-investor relocates R&D
offshore.
We now investigate the implications for the FDI game. We ask under
which circumstances FDI arises, focusing on the case where offshoring takes
place in the second stage, which is the natural analogue of the case of low
relocation costs (LRC) in the basic model.
Proposition 4 Suppose (16)-(17) hold. An equilibrium without FDI, but
with offshoring exists if and only if
ΠD(1 ) ≤ F .
Proof Conditions (16)-(17) guarantee that offshoring takes place in the equi-
librium subgame and in the subgames where one firm deviates in period 1.
In the No FDI equilibrium, the offshoring firm obtains equilibrium payoffs
ΠM (γ) − R. Deviation to FDI would yield ΠM (γ) + ΠD (1) − F − R, an-
ticipating that the deviating firm would still carry out offshoring after the
deviation. ¤
Appendix 3: Offshoring with intermediate trans-
portation costs
We now show that the results for the case of zero transportation costs es-
sentially generalize to the case of intermediate transportation costs: More
precisely, we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 3 On the one hand, transportation costs are high enough that
locations are served locally whenever possible.
Thus, marginal costs are never lower for a firm if it serves a location
from abroad than when it produces locally. This is automatically true in
R&D locations of the firm, whether it produces alone there or not. To make
sure it is also true in locations where the firm has no R&D, we require
h − γ∆ < h −∆+ t and h − βγ∆ < h − β∆+ t . It is simple to see that the
former condition is harder to fulfill, so that all we require is t > ∆(1 − γ), i.e.,
transportation costs are higher than the losses from internal communication.
Assumption 4 On the other hand, transportation costs are low enough
that, even if an exporting firm faces a local competitor, it obtains positive
profits in spite of the higher marginal costs.
Thus, even in locations where only one firm is present, there is (asym-
metric) duopoly competition resulting in positive profits for both firms. It
is simple to show that both conditions can be fulfilled simultaneously in
principle, a necessary condition being that competition is not too intense.
In the profit formulas, we write βT for a firm in a country to which it
exports from the home location when it is not an R&D center. Hence, when
there is no research center, the firms earn profits ΠD(β, βT ) in their home
location and ΠD(βT , β) in the foreign country. Similarly, for a firm that
exports from a research center, we write 1T for its marginal cost h −∆+ t .
Thus, if there is such a research center, then profits in the other country are
ΠD(γ, 1T ) for the firm that produces there and ΠD(1T , γ) for the exporter.
Consider the offshoring game when only one firm has chosen FDI. Then
this firm will choose offshoring if and only if
ΠD(1 ) +ΠD(γ, 1T )−ΠD(β, βT )−ΠD ((βγ, β)−R ≥ 0 .
In the research center, both firms obtain identical profits ΠD(1 ); in the
investor’s home location, its profits are ΠD(γ, 1T ), because it serves the loca-
tion locally with knowledge generated abroad in the research center, whereas
the competitor exports to the location from the research center. After devi-
ation to No Offshoring, the firm will face a competitor at home that serves
the location from abroad, resulting in profits of ΠD(β, βT ). Abroad it will
obtain ΠD(βγ, β) as it serves the foreign country with knowledge generated
at home, facing a competitor who produces knowledge locally. Thus, the
left-hand side gives the net advantage from offshoring.
We now assume that relocation will take place in the offshoring game,
i.e., the preceding condition holds. The condition for an equilibrium without
FDI then becomes
F ≥ ΠD(γ, 1T ) +ΠD (1 )−ΠD(β, βT )−ΠD(βγ, β)−R (18)
The fixed costs must outweigh the net advantage from FDI and offshoring.
It is straightforward to compare (18) to (3). The arguments are similar as
for no transportation costs.
